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Philosophic Sagacity: Aims and Functions 
The general aim of this essay is to enhance understanding of philosophic sagacity 
as an approach to African philosophy by way of a theoretical justification and exposition, 
given that at times we tend to disagree on the utility and practicability of a viewpoint for 
the simple reason that we have not grasped the theoretical facet.  In this endeavour, the 
essay has two specific objectives.  The first objective is to explicate the analytical and 
general origins of philosophic sagacity.  And the second is to delineate its major 
functions.  To date there is lack of any form of disquisition that is devoted to deliberately 
distinguishing these functions.  These two specific objectives are necessitated by the fact 
that of all the major approaches to African philosophy identified so far, philosophic 
sagacity is the most recent and hence proportionately the least understood, yet it has a 
cardinal role to play not only in academic African philosophy but in the social-political 
spaces and in suggesting solutions to problems in postcolonial Africa as well. 
 
Analytic Origins: Anthropological Uniforms and Dialogue 
 
H. Odera Oruka publicly pronounced philosophic sagacity as an approach to 
academic African philosophy to the international community in 1978.2  Any meaningful 
exposé of philosophic sagacity cannot fail to address its antithetical relationship with the 
other two major approaches, namely ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy, for 
therein truly lies its analytical origins within philosophical discourse.  At its inception, 
one of its major functions was to serve as a go-between for these two dominant, though 
antagonistic, approaches to African philosophy.3 
 
The implicit belief in the modus operandi of ethno-philosophy was the false claim 
that philosophy in the proper sense was a mental activity peculiar to some races and 
civilizations: it was regarded as Greek or more generally European.  The professional 
school, on the other hand, despite its genuine concerns and intentions in granting the 
existence of African philosophy, overemphasized on the connection between philosophy 
and some traits and methodologies that lent themselves to modernity to the exclusion of 
traditionalism, thereby also creating the false impression that traditional Africa was 
philosophy-free.   
 
Hence, whereas ethno-philosophy denied philosophy to Africa in toto, the 
professional school only did so with regard to traditional Africa.  The main difference 
between the two schools can also be interpreted in a slightly different way.  While ethno-
philosophy emphasized too much on the Africanness of African philosophy at the 
expense of philosophy proper, the professional school, on its part, over-focused on the 
professionalism of (African) philosophy and thereby relegating the Africanness into the 
periphery4.  Philosophic sagacity, it was envisaged, would retain the Africanness in 
ethno-philosophy but show the redundancy of its false claim, and also retain the 
professionalism in the school of professional philosophy but manoeuvre its way past the 
professional school’s attendant false impression.  Or, as I have sometimes put it, 
philosophic sagacity focuses on African thoughts that are truly philosophical and 
conversely, on philosophical thoughts that are genuinely African.5   
Cognizance of this fact is important because not all instances of African sagacity 
are philosophical. Some fall within the category of folk or mere sagacity.6  At the same 
time, it would be foolhardy to think that all philosophical thoughts are African. 
 
In the introduction of his text, Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern 
Debate on African Philosophy, Odera Oruka, in a rather non-conventional though 
captivating way, distinguishes philosophic sagacity from ethno-philosophy as follows: 
 
One way of looking for traces of African philosophy is to wear the uniform of 
anthropological field-workers and use dialogue to pass through anthropological 
fogs to philosophical ground.  The ethno-philosophers tried to do this but were 
unable to pass through the fogs, which they accepted as the definition of African 
philosophy.  This was inevitable since the ethno-philosophers started with the 
strong assumption that African philosophy and Western philosophy must and can 
only be different.7 
 
What is common to the proponents of philosophic sagacity and ethno-philosophy 
is that both wear the same uniform; that of anthropological field-workers.  In addition, 
they both employ dialogue.  However, they differ in the method and objective to which 
they put the dialogue to use.  The proponents of philosophic sagacity employ it not only 
to see but more importantly to pass through the anthropological fogs.  The ethno-
philosophers, on their part, merely employ it to see the anthropological fogs; indeed the 
manner in which they employ it cannot enable them see through or beyond the fogs.  
They therefore take what they see to constitute African philosophy. 
 
Using the same terminologies, one can also enunciate the similarity and difference 
between the perceptions of philosophic sagacity and the professional school.  In as far as 
the manner in which they both employ dialogue goes, they are in agreement, for they use 
it to enable them operate at the philosophical ground.  So, whereas ethno-philosophy 
employ dialogue as an end in itself, philosophic sagacity and the professional school use 
it as a means to an end.  However, the difference between philosophic sagacity and the 
professional school lies in the uniforms they wear.  Philosophic sagacity could begin its 
operations on the anthropological fields but then elevate to the philosophical terrain 
without necessarily discarding its uniform, the professional school, on the other hand, 
operates more-or-less exclusively on the philosophical plane hence the requirement of 
wearing the uniform of anthropological field-workers does not arise. 
 
Conventionally, philosophic sagacity subscribes to the view that even in 
traditional Africa there exist individuals who are capable of critical independent thinking: 
that this mode of thinking is not a monopoly of the modern world, as insinuated by the 
professional school.  Worth noting therefore is that, in so far as the definition of 
philosophy goes, philosophic sagacity is not at variance with the professional school.  It 
retrains, and operates within the basic presupposition of the definition of philosophy of 
the professional philosophers (school).  However, unlike the professional school, it is an 
expression of the wisdoms and beliefs of individuals who basically function within the 
traditional set-up.  It consists of thoughts of rigorous indigenous thinkers. 
These are men and women (sages) many of whom have not had the benefit of 
modern education.  But they are, nevertheless, critical, independent thinkers who 
guide their thoughts and judgments by the power of reason and inborn insight 
rather than by the authority of the communal consensus.  They are capable of 
taking a problem or a concept and offering a rigorous philosophical analysis of it, 
making clear rationally where they accept or reject the established or communal 
judgment on the matter.8 
 
It is necessary to make a qualification regarding the adjective “traditional” in 
describing a sage, for this has been a source of discomfort too some.  They have 
questioned if in this modern age there are any traditional Africans left.  Parker English 
and Kibujjo M. Kalumba, for example, pose the following question: “What about the 
‘traditional’ aspect of our characterization of ‘sagacity philosophy’?  Are all the sages 
involved traditional?  Have they been insulated from the rapid Westernization of Africa? 
If so, how?”9  According to English and Kalumba, African cultures are today not isolated 
from the rest of the world; hence the existence of traditional Africans in today’s world is 
a myth.  The position adapted by English and Kalumba misses Odera Oruka’s point in 
philosophic sagacity.  The important point which should not be lost sight of is that Odera 
Oruka in the philosophic sagacity project was interested in people who are deeply rooted 
in traditional African culture; rural people free from the effect of Western scholarship; 
people who are genuine representative of traditional Africa in modern setting.  In fact, 
according to Odera Oruka: 
 
Some of these persons might have been partly influenced by the inevitable moral 
and technological culture from the West, nevertheless their own outlook and 
cultural belonging remain basically that of traditional rural Africa.  And except 
for a handful of them, the majority of them are illiterate or semi-illiterate.10 
 
 
Three Functions of Philosophic Sagacity 
 
In the conclusion of an earlier essay titled “Philosophic Sagacity Revisited”, I 
identified the three aims of philosophic sagacity to be: (1) bridging the gap between 
ethno-philosophy and the professional school; (2) a useful avenue in assisting formulate a 
systematic national culture; (3) a useful source of information, knowledge and 
education.11  In this essay, I intend to elaborate on the three aims and will refer to them as 
the Academic, Cultural-Nationalist, and Epistemic functions, respectively.  They can also 
be viewed as, or referred to as, trends in philosophic sagacity. 
 
Academic Function:  In the history of African philosophy several scholars have posited 
diverse views regarding the nature and definition of African philosophy.  From the 
myriad of literature, one can observe that the bone of contention and the central point of 
issue regarding the nature of African philosophy, may be reduced and put in the form of a 
couple of questions. 
 
First: Is philosophy the product of a universal human reason or is every 
philosophy in some significant way an expression of the culture which produces 
it? And, second, a different but closely related question: are logic, rationality, and 
argumentation intrinsic and even necessary characteristics of anything which 
claims to be philosophy, or are these just peculiar to Western philosophy and thus 
not normative to African philosophy?12 
 
Prior to Odera Oruka’s seminal essay, which according to Hallen was probably 
the first serious attempt to write the history of contemporary African philosophy, “Four 
Trends in Current African Philosophy”13, the various solutions suggested for the two 
questions posed above pointed in the direction of either the school of professional 
philosophy or ethno-philosophy.  There were those who thought that philosophy is the 
product of a universal human reason and that logic, rationality and argumentation are its 
intrinsic characteristics.  African philosophy was therefore no exception.  This was the 
position of the professional school.  On the other hand, there were those who believed 
that every philosophy is in some significant way an expression of the culture that 
produces it.  Hence logic, rationality and argumentation may be intrinsic and even 
necessary features of Western philosophy, but not normative to African philosophy.  So 
for instance, Lucius Outlaw rejects the claim that African philosophy has to be rational 
and argues that the concept of rationality as used in philosophy is a product of Western 
culture.14  This was the driving force of the proponents of ethno-philosophy. 
 
It is when the academic confrontation between the ethno-philosophers and 
professional philosophers reached a critical stage; a stage that made any meaningful 
discussions on African philosophy between the two antagonists impossible, that Odera 
Oruka announced to the world philosophic sagacity as yet another trend in African 
philosophy.  Philosophic sagacity therefore came in as a rescue team in the fierce 
academic battle between ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy.  It sought to 
offer an escape route for those who found themselves entangled in the war of words but 
who nevertheless felt that the war was being fought on shaky front lines.  This role of 
philosophic sagacity is what we refer to as the academic function.  It was meant to 
disprove the position (or the impression) created within philosophical academic circles, 
by both the ethno-philosophers and professional philosophers alike, that traditional Africa 
was a place that was “free from philosophic, rational discourse and personalised 
philosophical activity.”15  In this regard, the task and function of philosophic sagacity 
within academia was to grapple with the following question: “Was traditional Africa a 
place where no persons had the room or mind to think independently and at times even 
critically of the communal consensus?”16 
 
The response of philosophic sagacity to the question above is in the negative 
form.  In actual fact the negative response captures the very essence of the academic 
function of philosophic sagacity.  For in truth, philosophic sagacity is an expression of 
the view that among the various traditional African communities there exist individuals 
who are critical independent thinkers.  Or as Masolo ably puts it, the underpin of; 
 
African philosophic sagacity is that in Africa, contemporary or traditional, there 
were and must still be wise men and women who, despite their lack of modern 
and formal education, convey critical thinking that is essentially philosophical and 
distinct from the type of general narrative description of cultural traditions, 
customs, and laws as portrayed by the old sage Ogotemmêli of the Dogon.”17 
 
Philosophic sagacity therefore proves that the problem in traditional Africa is not 
that of logic, reason or scientific curiosity. 
 
It shows that communal consensus, a fact typical of most societies, should not be 
seen as a hindrance for individual critical reflection.  Just as religion and all kinds 
of dogmatic fanaticism did not kill philosophy in the West, traditional African 
folk wisdom and taboos left some room for philosophic thought.18 
 
It is worth noting that Odera Oruka’s earlier essays on African philosophy written 
in the 1970s and early 1980s squarely operate within the confines of the academic 
function.  His concern in the essays is to argue for and prove the existence of 
philosophers in the traditional set-up.  He does not focus on the epistemological 
productions of their thoughts as such, and neither is the interest that of showing the 
relevance of their thoughts to cultural and national issues.  It is in this spirit that Odera 
Oruka compared and contrasted Ogotemmêli’s and Paul Mbuya’s thoughts.19  So, if one 
were to make an assessment of Mbuya’s thoughts as presented in Odera Oruka’s 
“Sagacity in African Philosophy”, it is only fair that one does so against the background 
of the academic function of philosophic sagacity. 
 
Cultural-Nationalist Function: The question of nationalism, or better yet cultural 
nationalism, has been a preoccupation of most post-colonial African nation-states.  It has 
been a concern of politicians and scholars alike.  After gaining political independence, 
most African nation-states came face to face with the reality of national unity.  The 
diverse cultures of the various ethnic groups located within the same national boundaries 
posed a great challenge to the emergent African nation-states.  Cultural issues have and 
continue to hamper national unity even today.  These include ethnicity, nepotism, 
religious affiliations, regionalism and racialism.  It is this negative impact of culture to 
national unity that underlies the second function of philosophic sagacity.  In his research 
proposal titled “The Philosophical Roots of Culture in Kenya”, Odera Oruka’s main 
objective was to assist his home country ground itself as a harmonious nation by coming 
up with a national culture. 
 
The researches would be undertaken in two phases.  The objective during the first 
phase would be to unearth the culture philosophies of the various ethnic groups.  During 
this phase, identification and explication of the fundamental principles upon which the 
various cultures are based would be made.  The services of both folk and philosophic 
sages would be utilized.20  However, during the second phase it is the philosophic sages 
who would play a cardinal role.  They would be required to rationalize over and resolve 
those fundamental principles that are inconsistent.  They would be relied upon to 
recommend alternative ideas that are consistent and upon which a national culture would 
be constructed. 
 
One should be able to fathom why we refer to this function as cultural-nationalist.  
This is because it is geared towards matters concerning culture in relation to the question 
of nationalism.  Alternatively stated, it seeks to build national unity (second phase) using 
culture (first phase) as the pedestal.  This is fundamental given the role cultural issues 
play in weakening national spirit. 
 
Odera Oruka was convinced that in Kenya (as in most parts of Africa) unearthing 
of the philosophies of the various cultures was an urgent and primary concern.  There 
were two reasons for this: 
 
First, philosophy is always the moving spirit and the theoretical framework of any 
national culture.  Any serious and meaningful national culture must have a 
philosophy.  Second, because Kenya as a State is struggling tirelessly to ground 
itself permanently as a nation – and a national culture is always the axis of a 
nation.21 
 
Some people hardly see the linkage between culture and philosophy.  They 
believe that the two are totally different and have nothing to do with each other.  Such 
individuals would therefore hardly appreciate the cultural-nationalist function of 
philosophic sagacity.  This, however, is a mistaken view.  Culture like any other practice 
always requires a rationalization and justification; it requires a philosophy.  If culture is 
taken as a general way of life of a people, the way it is ordinarily taken, then to talk of the 
philosophy of a people’s culture is to talk of the basic reasons justifying the people’s 
general way of life.  Therefore, for anyone to argue that culture has nothing to do with 
philosophy or that it needs no philosophy is to admit that there is no need for any people 
to justify and intellectually defend their way of life.  Such a position is absurd and would 
have dangerous consequences for any culture and nation as well. 
 
In his research proposal, Odera Oruka shows the relevance of a unifying culture in 
the definition of a nation, but not the State.  He postulates that one important distinction 
between a State and a nation lies in the concept of culture.  A nation has (or is supposed 
to have) a unifying culture; a State on the other hand has a unifying and formalized 
political power.  Moreover, although a political power can defend and help develop a 
unifying culture, it need not itself be a sign for the existence of a culture.  Odera Oruka 
then asserts that: “The Republic of South Africa, I believe, is an example of a State which 
is not a nation.  And the Palestinian people together constitute a nation, not a State.”22 
 
In the conclusion of his research proposal, Odera Oruka warns that it is time the 
fundamental principles justifying various aspects of culture were unearthed.  This 
according to him is the great challenge facing African scholars and cultural 
conservationists.  They should “investigate and unearth such principles.  This is necessary 
both for posterity and for the development of a national culture.  This investigation or 
research should be a part of the national programme in every African State.”23  
Otherwise, they will remain States but far from being nations.  Once the principles 
underlying and justifying the various aspects of culture have been unearthed, articulated, 
and harmonized to form a national culture then this would have the additional advantage 
of acting as check and withstanding the invasion by obnoxious foreign ideas.  For 
postcolonial Africa to overcome this invasion it does not need guns; one cannot fight for 
or defend ideas by use of guns, one can only successfully fight for or defend ideas with 
ideas. 
 
Epistemic Function: Within this function philosophic sagacity is considered to be a 
source as well as storehouse of knowledge.  The interest in this function of sagacity is 
that philosophic discussions and discourses should focus on various features and themes 
that emanate from traditional African societies.  These could be cultural, religious, 
linguistic etc.  The basic difference between the epistemic function and the cultural-
nationalist one is that, whereas in the latter function the aim is primarily to unearth the 
fundamental principles of culture with a view of harmonious co-existence, in the former 
function the aim is to generate and sustain philosophical discussions with African themes. 
 
However, in order to enhance the fulfilment of the epistemic function, it is 
imperative that the thoughts of both folk and philosophic sages be written so that they are 
readily available for (further) philosophical discussions.  The ready availability of such 
texts would not only be an immediate source of knowledge but would enhance further 
philosophical discussions.  In this respect, Odera Oruka declares: “The time has now 
come to put their thinking and expressions into the written word for a larger audience and 
for the world community.”24  With this done, the philosophical discourses that would 
stem there from would be based on underlying cultural principles that have been 
rationalized and justified by the sages. 
 
Over the years, the rate of literacy in Africa has increased tremendously.  More 
and more people are now relying on the written word as their source of information and 
knowledge.  This is unlike the yester traditional African societies, which were largely 
non-literate and as a result, individuals relied on the spoken word.  In such societies, 
sages played an important role as sources of knowledge and in the dissemination of the 
same through the spoken word.  If sagacity is to fit in and be consistent with the modern 
African ambiance, then it is necessary that the thoughts of the sages be well and neatly 
documented.  For indeed, this is one sure way of seeing to it that the wisdoms of the 
society and the thoughts of the sages are readily available to, and influence later 
generations, with least distortion.  Otherwise, if this were not done then, the very moment 
a sage dies would be like a situation where a whole library has burnt down.  In this 
connection, Odera Oruka correctly observes that: 
 
A society in which most people think libraries, books and museums are the real 
sources of what they need to know, will feel it has less need for a living sage than 
a society which lacks the advantage of numerous libraries, books and museums.25 
 
Odera Oruka’s observation is both cautionary and advisory.  Cautionary in that we should 
take precautions so that whole libraries are not burnt down, and advisory in that in 
modern Africa, documentation has become a reality; consequently, the thoughts of the 
living sages should be put in written word so that they become part and parcel of this 
reality.  Otherwise, their thoughts will fall in an abyss.  The thoughts of the ancient Greek 
philosophers continue to influence us even today.  Thanks to the fact that they transcribed 
their thoughts or their thoughts were transcribed by others in some cases. 
 
At this point one may want to ask if there is any peculiar attribute in the thoughts 
of the sages that warrant and strengthen the need for their documentation.  The answer 
lies in Odera Oruka’s later definition of a sage.  Earlier, he had defined a sage simply as a 
person “versed in the wisdoms and traditions of his people.”26  However, later, he 
attached the ethical quality as a necessary component to the definition.  The thoughts of 
the sage are to be seen as primarily concerned with the ethical and empirical issues, and 
questions relevant to the society, and his or her ability to offer insightful solutions to 
some of those issues.  For the sake of explication, a lengthy quotation from Odera Oruka 
is inevitable.  He is emphatic that a sage has two qualities or attributes, 
 
…insight and ethical inspiration.  So, a sage is wise; he has insight, but he 
employs this for the ethical betterment of the community.  A philosopher may be 
a sage and vice versa.  But many philosophers do lack the ethical commitment 
and inspiration found in the sage…  A sage proper, is usually the friend of truth 
and wisdom.  A sage may suppress truth only because wisdom dictates not 
because of some instrumental gain.  Indeed, Pythagoras’ definition of a 
philosopher as “the lover of wisdom” should have been reserved for a sage, since 
the sophists were the grave-diggers of wisdom and truth.  Socrates was wrongly 
labelled, “philosopher”; he was first and foremost a sage.  Socrates used 
philosophy only as a means to advance his sagacity and expose the hypocrisies of 
his time.  But when all this is said, one must still emphasize that sagacity and 
philosophy are not incompatible…27 
 
The sages therefore play an important epistemic role in their respective societies 
given their ethical inspiration.  The epistemic function of philosophic sagacity can 
therefore also be seen as the vehicle through which noble and desirable ethical principles 
and practices of a given community would be accentuated and hence readily preserved 
after being subjected to critical analysis. 
 
In his essay “Sagacity in Development” Odera Oruka illustrates the practical 
epistemic significance of sagacity.  In the essay, he argues and shows that if sages are 
used as sources of information then their explanations can go a long way in throwing 
light on the socio-cultural factors (problems) that affect change and development in their 
societies.  Government and non-governmental organization officials in African countries 
who are concerned with development strategies and plans should therefore consult and 
utilize the thoughts of sages, if they sincerely wish to attain any meaningful degree of 
success in their development endeavours.28 
 
Conclusions 
The rationale of the first specific objective of the essay was to locate philosophic 
sagacity in the history of the debate regarding the nature of African philosophy.  It served 
the purpose of showing the similarities as well as differences between it and the other two 
schools namely ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy, for some individuals have 
often mistakenly conceptualized it exclusively in contradistinction to ethno-philosophy 
and professional philosophy.  The second specific objective was meant to show that, 
contrary to popular belief, the function of philosophic sagacity is not unitary but diverse. 
 
Of the three functions of philosophic sagacity, it is perhaps the epistemic one that 
has the potential of retaining its vibrancy for yet awhile.  Within scholarship we are 
becoming more and more interested not only in knowledge of our past history and 
traditions, but in how that past can be sifted in the face of the shifting modern times.  
African and Africanist philosophers should not merely be contented with the explication 
and retention of good and desirable ethical principles and practices of African societies, 
but should also be concerned with how such principles and practices are to be mingled 
with those from Western societies.  This of course requires familiarity with 
epistemological issues from both the societies. 
 
Today the aim of the academic aspect of sagacity, of identifying the sages as 
proof for the existence of genuine African philosophy is becoming less necessary.  This is 
because the argument that Africans are incapable of philosophizing is no longer tenable.  
On the face of it, the objective of the cultural-nationalist function is noble and admirable.  
It is practical in that it is concerned with finding solutions to a serious practical problem; 
a problem that revolves round matters of social, cultural and political concerns and 
integration.  The first phase of this category will definitely interest to both scholars and 
non-scholars for some time to come.  In Africa today, there is a concern, especially 
amongst the elders, that the indigenous population hardly know anything about their 
cultures, leave alone the philosophies underlying them.  One may say that they are 
uncultured in as far as most of the traditions and social institutions of their communities 
are concerned.  This is the implication and concern of one of the sages in Masolo’s essay 
when the sage says the following of the young Luo generation: “In fact very many of 
them, cannot even speak correct Dholuo.”29  The Kiswahili saying “mwacha mila ni 
mtumwa” which literally translates to “he who abandons, ignores, or does not know his 
people’s culture and customs is a slave” also captures the concern of the first phase of the 
cultural-nationalist function.  However, the second phase of the function is more political 
than academic and hence meaningful involvement of scholars in it will continue to be 
minimal and elusive for some while given that the political arena in Africa is generally 
hardly conducive to scholars especially those in the humanities and social sciences. 
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